After the fall of its authoritarian regime in 1998, Indonesia pursued an unusual course of democratization. It was insider-dominated and gradualist, and it involved free elections before a lengthy process of constitutional reform. At the end of the process, Indonesia's amended constitution was essentially a new and thoroughly democratic document. By proceeding as they did, the Indonesians averted the conflict that would have arisen between adherents of the old constitution and proponents of radical, immediate reform. Gradual reform also made possible the adoption of institutions that preserved pluralism and pushed politics toward the center. The resulting democracy has a number of prominent flaws, many attributable to the process chosen, but is a better outcome than the most likely alternatives. Donald L. Horowitz documents the decisions that gave rise to this distinctive constitutional process. He then traces the effects of the new institutions on Indonesian politics and discusses their shortcomings as well as their achievements in steering Indonesia away from the dangers of polarization and violence, all the while placing the Indonesian story in the context of comparative experience with constitutional design and intergroup conflict. Donald L. Horowitz is James B. Duke Professor of Law and Political Science at Duke University and a Fellow at the National Endowment for Democracy. He has previously been a Centennial Professor at the London School of Economics and a Carnegie Scholar. Elected to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, he has served as president of the American Society for Political and Legal Philosophy. In 2009, Horowitz was presented with the Distinguished Scholar Award by the Ethnicity, Nationalism, and Migration Section of the International Studies Association, and in 2011 he was awarded an honorary doctoral degree by the Flemish-speaking Free University of Brussels. He is the author of six previous books, including The Courts and Social Policy, which won the Brownlow Prize of the National Academy of Public Administration; A Democratic South Africa?, winner of the Bunche Award of the American Political Science Association; and the acclaimed Ethnic Groups in Conflict. In 2013, Professor Horowitz will be a Fellow of the American Academy in Berlin, working on a book on constitutional design for divided societies, a subject on which he has advised in a number of countries. The series seeks manuscripts central to the understanding of international politics that will be empirically rich and conceptually innovative. It is interested in works that illuminate the evolving character of nation-states within the international system. It sets out three broad areas for investigation: (1) identity, security, and conflict; (2) democracy; and (3) justice and distribution.
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Preface
There is some consensus among political scientists and constitutional lawyers that the choice of process matters for constitution making. Likewise, the choice of political institutions matters for democratization and for the reduction of the conflict potential of ethnic or cultural cleavages. There is, however, no consensus on which process and which institutions are most apt for these objectives. In considerable measure, this is because the search for broad generalizations has obscured the importance of starting conditions for making appropriate processual and institutional choices in particular countries. Initial conditions, especially the relations of political forces and the structure of cleavages, are constraints that limit choices and suggest to decision makers what may be suitable methods of proceeding and ways to structure the reformed political system. There is, then, no universal solvent in choice of constitutional reform process or in institutional arrangements to reduce conflict in ways that comport with democracy. Rather, there are likely to be several appropriate paths for each, including Indonesia's.
Following a long period of authoritarian rule that ended in 1998, Indonesian politicians made a number of critical choices, first about the process by which they would reform their political institutions and then about what those institutions should be. The distinctive problems they faced and the specific fears they entertained shaped the way they chose to do their job. That process in turn affected the bargains they struck and the political structures they created, as well as the old-regime practices they left intact. To understand this causal chain, it is necessary to ask why the Indonesian democratizers and constitution drafters took the steps they ix www.cambridge.org © in this web service Cambridge University Press Cambridge University Press 978-1-107-02727-5 -Constitutional Change and Democracy in Indonesia Donald L. Horowitz Frontmatter More information did in the sequence they did -in other words, to explicate the micrologic of the process and its results.
On the whole, the distinctive Indonesian path to reform was well suited to the situation that confronted the participants and for the aims and apprehensions that animated them. This is true even though they utilized an in-house and nonparticipatory process of constitutional renovation that some scholars regard as inappropriate for crafting democratic institutions. Their institutional choices also had a generally benign impact on the rather dangerous conflict situation that the country faced as it made the transition to democracy. The Indonesian reformers chose certain institutions that tended to reinforce a multipolar structure of cleavages and to avert the emergence of more dangerous bipolar alignments. These institutions also made political cooperation across the lines of multiple groups attractive to politicians operating under those institutions. Some of these choices were made with such effects in mind, while others were made on other grounds and produced their effects on group relations inadvertently.
Challenges in group relations in Indonesia certainly persist, and there are recurrent problems in the polity that have been neglected or treated inadequately. The particular process that was chosen in Indonesia had its costs. Moreover, the Indonesians have by no means finished tinkering with their political institutions. Further refinement of some political structuressuch as a better-designed upper house -could create a stronger democracy. Amendment of others -such as an electoral system that dramatically reduces the number of parties -might well produce retrogression in the handling of group relations by the political system. Nevertheless, there is no gainsaying the Indonesian achievements, which have brought the country very far from where it was in 1998. What the Indonesian experience shows is that unconventional processes can produce democratic outcomes and that unusual configurations of institutions can produce political incentives for intergroup accommodation.
As the research and writing for this book were being carried out, I incurred a great many debts. Released time was provided by a generous Bost Research Professorship, funded by the Charles A. Cannon Trust, at Duke Law School. Grants for the larger constitutional design project in which this book began its life were provided by the United States Institute of Peace, the Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation, and the Carnegie Scholars Program of the Carnegie Corporation. I am grateful to all of these grantors. I have also been heavily dependent on the resourcefulness of librarians, in this case most notably the extraordinary reference services provided by Melanie Dunshee, Molly Brownfield, and Jennifer Pancasila Five Principles, the official ideological foundation of the Indonesian state, found in the preamble to the constitution. The principles consist of belief in one God, a just and civilized humanity, the unity of Indonesia, democracy guided by wisdom and deliberation, and social justice. 
